Russiagate Primary Source Review

The Steele Dossier

Fusion GPS and the Commissioning of Steele

• Fusion GPS was co-founded by former journalists Glenn Simpson, Peter Fritsch, and Thomas Catan and performed investigative and opposition research.
• During the Republican primaries, the Washington Free Beacon retained Fusion GPS to research Donald Trump. That engagement ended before Fusion hired Christopher Steele.
• Perkins Coie, a law firm representing the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton campaign, later retained Fusion GPS for a separate Trump research project.
• Fusion hired Steele, a former British intelligence officer, to investigate possible Trump-Russia ties. Steele produced a series of memoranda that became known collectively as the Steele dossier.

Steele provided reporting to the FBI. Steele and Fusion GPS also conveyed portions of the reporting to other government officials and journalists. These relationships and the FBI’s handling of the resulting information are described in the Justice Department Inspector General’s Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation.

Circulation and Inclusion in the Classified Assessment

During the same period that Steele’s reporting was circulating among government officials and journalists, senior FBI leadership was aware of the Clinton Plan intelligence. FBI Director James Comey attended Brennan’s August 3, 2016 briefing, and the CIA formally transmitted the intelligence to the FBI in a September 7 investigative referral. The Crossfire Hurricane team received Steele’s first six reports on September 19. By that point, the FBI possessed intelligence alleging that Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign strategy to associate Trump with Russian election interference, although the authenticity of that intelligence remained unresolved. According to the Durham Annex, the FBI took no investigative steps to corroborate or disprove the Clinton Plan information.

By late 2016, the material had circulated among officials and journalists in Washington. The public January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment did not reproduce the dossier. The highest-classified assessment included a two-page summary as an annex, accompanied by a disclaimer that the material had not been used to reach the assessment’s analytic conclusions.

The CIA’s 2025 tradecraft review found that a reference to the annex also appeared in the body of the classified assessment as a supporting point for the judgment that Vladimir Putin aspired to help Trump win. The review concluded that this placement “implicitly elevated unsubstantiated claims to the status of credible supporting evidence,” compromising the analytic integrity of the judgment. It also recorded a warning from the CIA’s Deputy Director for Analysis.

CIA’s Deputy Director for Analysis warned in an email to Brennan on 29 December that including it in any form risked “the credibility of the entire paper.”

Source: CIA Tradecraft Review, pp. 4–5.

The Carter Page FISA Applications

The FBI submitted its first Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act application concerning Carter Page on October 21, 2016. The Bureau filed three renewals on January 12, April 7, and June 29, 2017.

The Justice Department Inspector General found that the FBI relied on Steele’s reporting even though the Bureau had not corroborated the specific allegations about Page contained in that reporting.

We found that the FBI did not have information corroborating specific allegations against Carter Page in Steele’s reporting when it relied upon his reports in the first FISA application or subsequent renewal applications.

Source: DOJ Inspector General, Review of Four FISA Applications, p. 11.

At the time of the first application, the Crossfire Hurricane team suspected that Steele had been retained for political opposition research but did not know the identity of the ultimate client. The application described the source’s purpose in general terms rather than naming the campaign. The Inspector General reported that the precise funding relationship was broadly known among relevant officials by February and March 2017.

Source: DOJ Inspector General, Review of Four FISA Applications, pp. 129–130 and 155.

There is no evidence in the cited records that President Obama approved or was briefed on the Page application. Under the established process, the White House did not prepare, approve, or sign the application.

1. The FBI prepared the application.
2. Attorneys in the Justice Department’s National Security Division reviewed it.
3. A designated senior Justice Department official approved its submission.
4. A judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court determined whether the statutory standard had been met.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court explains that it reviews government applications to determine whether the applicable factual and legal requirements have been satisfied.

The investigation’s code name, Crossfire Hurricane, came from the Rolling Stones lyric “I was born in a crossfire hurricane” in “Jumpin’ Jack Flash” from 1968.

Information That Raised Reliability Concerns

Funding and Political Purpose

Steele did not initially identify the ultimate clients when he began supplying reports. The Inspector General found that the team understood the work to be political opposition research but learned the precise funding chain only after the first application. Steele told investigators that he knew by late July 2016 that Perkins Coie represented the DNC, although he could not recall when he communicated that information to the FBI.

FBI officials told us that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not know who hired Fusion GPS (who hired Steele) until after the first FISA application was filed, though, as described previously, the Crossfire Hurricane team and Steele’s handling agent suspected Steele had been hired to conduct political opposition research.

Documents indicate that by February and March 2017 it was broadly known among FBI officials involved with the investigation, and shared with senior NSD and OSAG officials, that Fusion GPS was hired first by a candidate during the Republican primaries and then later someone related to the Democratic Party.

We asked Steele when he learned who had retained Fusion GPS to obtain information concerning Trump and the Trump campaign. He told us he could not recall when he first learned it was the law firm Perkins Coie and the Democratic National Committee, though he was certain it was not at the outset of the engagement with Fusion GPS.

Steele further stated that, by late July 2016, Steele had met with Simpson and an attorney from Perkins Coie, which represented the DNC, and Steele said by that time he was aware of the DNC’s role. He stated that he could not remember when he provided Perkins Coie’s name to the FBI, but believed it was probable that he did so, but not in July 2016.

Source: DOJ Inspector General, Review of Four FISA Applications, pp. 129–130 and 192.

Media Contacts and Termination as a Confidential Source

Steele had served as an FBI confidential human source since 2013. In September 2016, he discussed his reporting with journalists from Yahoo News, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. Yahoo News published its article on September 23. After a Mother Jones article based on an interview with Steele appeared, the FBI formally closed him as a source on November 1, 2016, for disclosing his relationship with the Bureau. Closure ended the FBI’s ability to task him directly, although the Bureau later continued receiving information from him through Justice Department official Bruce Ohr.

[Redacted] is a foreign national currently employed at his or her own business. … [Redacted] was closed on 01 November 2016 due to disclosing his or her relationship with the FBI to an online publication website.

Sources: FBI Vault, Records Between FBI and Christopher Steele, Part 02, p. 8; DOJ Inspector General, pp. 172–173.

Bruce Ohr’s Warnings

Ohr met with Steele and Fusion GPS co-founder Glenn Simpson in 2016 and conveyed information to the FBI. According to the Inspector General, Ohr told the Bureau that Steele’s reporting was reaching the Clinton campaign and others, that Simpson was paying Steele to discuss it with the media, and that Steele was strongly opposed to Trump’s election.

Steele was “desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being the U.S. President.”

OHR knew that Glenn Simpson was hired by a lawyer who does opposition research. … OHR knew that Simpson was hired to dig up dirt on Trump.

Source: FBI FD-302 of Bruce Ohr interview, November 22, 2016, pp. 2–3.

The Primary Sub-Source

By late December 2016, FBI analysts had identified Igor Danchenko, a Russian-born analyst living in the United States, as Steele’s primary sub-source. Danchenko conveyed information attributed to a wider network of sub-sources. The FBI did not interview him until January 2017, after the classified assessment had been completed.

The Inspector General found that interviews in January, March, and May 2017 raised substantial questions about the way Steele had characterized the information. Danchenko said he had not seen Steele’s reports until they became public and indicated that Steele had misstated or exaggerated several of his accounts.

The FBI conducted interviews of the Primary Sub-source in January, March, and May 2017 that raised significant questions about the reliability of the Steele election reporting.

In particular, the FBI’s interview with Steele’s Primary Sub-source in January 2017, shortly after the FBI filed the Carter Page FISA Renewal Application No. 1 and months prior to Renewal Application No. 2, raised doubts about the reliability of Steele’s descriptions of information in his election reports.

The Primary Sub-source told the FBI that he/she had not seen Steele’s reports until they became public that month, and made statements indicating that Steele misstated or exaggerated the Primary Sub-source’s statements in multiple sections of the reporting.

Source: DOJ Inspector General, Review of Four FISA Applications, report pp. 186–187; PDF pp. 225–226.

In the later interviews, Danchenko described portions of the information as word of mouth, hearsay, casual conversations, and, in one instance, a remark made in jest. He also said that he had not expected Steele to present his statements as established facts.

The Primary Sub-source stated that he/she never expected Steele to put the Primary Sub-source’s statements in reports or present them as facts.

According to WFO Agent 1, the Primary Sub-source said he/she made it clear to Steele that he/she had no proof to support statements from his/her sub-sources and that “it was just talk.”

WFO Agent 1 said that the Primary Sub-source explained that his/her information came from “word of mouth and hearsay” and “conversation that [he/she] had with friends over beers,” and that some of the information, such as allegations about Trump’s sexual activities, were statements he/she heard made in “jest.”

Source: DOJ Inspector General, Review of Four FISA Applications, report pp. 186–187; PDF pp. 225–226.

The first renewal had already been filed. The second and third renewals had not. The Inspector General found that the subsequent applications did not adequately convey the reliability problems developed through these interviews.

The Intelligence Community Assessment

Scope and Principal Judgments

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the public version of Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections on January 6, 2017. The highest-classified version was dated December 30, 2016. The CIA, FBI, and NSA jointly prepared the assessment.

The agencies assessed that President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign directed at the 2016 election. They attributed three broad objectives to the operation: undermining public confidence in the democratic process, damaging Hillary Clinton’s candidacy and prospective presidency, and improving Donald Trump’s electoral prospects when possible by discrediting Clinton. The confidence levels were not identical. The CIA and FBI expressed high confidence in the third judgment; the NSA expressed moderate confidence.

The public report expressly stated that it did not assess the effect of Russian activity on the election’s outcome. It also distinguished intrusion into election-related systems from alteration of vote tallies and reported that the systems observed being targeted were not involved in tallying votes.

“Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment that has been provided to the President and to recipients approved by the President.

Source: 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, pp. i–iii and 1–3.

The public report stated that it could not reveal the full supporting information without exposing sensitive sources or methods. It also stated that its conclusions were reflected in the classified assessment, while the declassified version omitted supporting intelligence and information concerning sources and methods.

Public and Classified Versions

The public report explained that it was a declassified version of a more highly classified assessment. It stated that the conclusions were the same but that the public document omitted intelligence, sources, and methods that could not be disclosed.

The public annex addressed the historical activity of the Russian state-funded network RT, including material about the 2012 election. It did not include the separate two-page summary of Steele’s reporting that appeared in the classified annex.

Sources: 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment; CIA Tradecraft Review, pp. 4–5.

Senior congressional leaders with access to the most sensitive intelligence, commonly called the Gang of Eight, received classified briefings. At the time, the group consisted of:

House of Representatives

• Paul Ryan — Speaker of the House
• Nancy Pelosi — House Minority Leader
• Devin Nunes — Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
• Adam Schiff — Ranking Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Senate

• Mitch McConnell — Senate Majority Leader
• Chuck Schumer — Senate Minority Leader
• Richard Burr — Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
• Mark Warner — Vice Chair, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Adam Schiff was one of the prominent political figures who referenced and promoted the Steele Dossier as part of the broader Russiagate narrative. Schiff repeatedly cited the Steele Dossier during congressional hearings and media appearances as evidence that there were suspicious ties between the Trump campaign and Russia. During the height of the Russiagate investigations—roughly 2017 through 2019—he frequently appeared on major nightly talk shows and news programs. He made multiple appearances on shows like The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, The Tonight Show Starring Jimmy Fallon, Meet the Press, Face the Nation, and various CNN and MSNBC programs. While Schiff typically framed the dossier as just one piece of the intelligence puzzle, he nevertheless presented it as credible enough to warrant serious investigation.

Sanctions and the Assessment Timeline

On December 29, 2016, while the Intelligence Community Assessment was still being finalized, the Obama administration announced sanctions against Russian individuals and entities, closed two Russian compounds, and expelled 35 Russian intelligence operatives. The administration said the measures were taken in response to Russian cyber operations directed at the election, its previously announced assessment that Russia had interfered in the election process, and the harassment of U.S. diplomats. The highest-classified ICA was dated December 30, and the public version was released on January 6, meaning that the administration acted on the underlying intelligence and its existing assessments rather than waiting for the completed ICA.

Election Infrastructure and the Broader Influence Campaign

December 7 talking points prepared for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated that foreign adversaries had not used cyberattacks on election infrastructure to alter the presidential election outcome and that the intelligence community had no evidence of manipulation of election infrastructure intended to change results.

Foreign adversaries did not use cyberattacks on election infrastructure to alter the U.S. Presidential election outcome. We have no evidence of cyber manipulation of election infrastructure intended to alter results.

Source: ODNI declassified records released July 17, 2025, p. 19 of the PDF.

The December 7 statements addressed election infrastructure and vote totals.

On December 9, The Washington Post published “Secret CIA assessment says Russia was trying to help Trump win White House”, citing unnamed officials.

The CIA has concluded in a secret assessment that Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump win the presidency, rather than just to undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system, according to officials briefed on the matter.

A senior U.S. official said there were minor disagreements among intelligence agencies, in part because some questions remained unanswered.

Source: The Washington Post, December 9, 2016.

This appears to run counter to Clapper’s assessment, which should hardly be viewed as minor.

Recent declassifications have also shed new light on the underlying intelligence used to claim Vladimir Putin was “in the bag” for Trump. Much of that material has now been described as flimsy, speculative, and lacking credibility, further casting doubt on the narrative that Russia had definitively intervened in the 2016 election on Trump’s behalf. The declassified intel below refers to the classified ICA, as opposed to the public version. At present, the original, classified ICA, Russian Influence Campaign: Targeting the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, has not been declassified or made public.

Putin had made this decision after he had come to believe that the Democratic nominee had better odds of winning the U.S. presidential election, and that [Trump], whose victory Putin was counting on, most likely would not be able to pull off a convincing victory.

Source: HPSCI, Oversight Investigation and Referral, p. 6.

Much of the judgment that Putin preferred Trump rested on a single highly classified CIA report containing a fragment whose meaning was uncertain and whose implications were not corroborated by additional intelligence. According to one senior CIA operations officer, “We don’t know what was meant by that” and “five people read it five ways.” Although the underlying report was considered credibly sourced, the standalone judgment that Putin “aspired” to help Trump was absent from the first draft and added to a subsequent version. It remained in the final Intelligence Community Assessment with CIA Director John Brennan’s support, despite objections from senior CIA officials who argued that the judgment was weakly supported and unnecessary.

Sources: HPSCI, Oversight Investigation and Referral, pp. 5–10; CIA Tradecraft Review, pp. 6–7.

The House majority staff report quoted another assessment:

As early as February 2016, a Russian political expert possessed a plan that recommended engagement with [Trump’s] team because of the prospects for improved U.S.-Russian relations, according to reporting from [a foreign] service.

Source: HPSCI, Oversight Investigation and Referral, pp. 5–10.

The staff report stated that the underlying document lacked a date, an identified sender, a clear recipient, and a classification marking.

The report also stated that two senior CIA operations officers argued to the CIA director:

We don’t have direct information that Putin wanted to get Trump elected, and therefore the judgment that Putin was counting on Trump’s victory should be removed from the ICA or the ICA should be changed.

Source: HPSCI, Oversight Investigation and Referral, pp. 5–10.

The same staff report stated:

The ICA omitted reliably sourced information, such as how some Russian intelligence officials were “planning for candidate Clinton’s victory” while others assessed “neither Trump nor Clinton” would respect Russian interests.

Source: HPSCI, Oversight Investigation and Referral, pp. 5–10.

The CIA Tradecraft Review stated that the assessment would have benefited from presenting reporting suggesting greater Russian ambivalence.

The Oxferd Comma Investigation

On July 30, 2026, the FBI declassified the opening, notification, and closing communications for an investigation code-named Oxferd Comma. The records were released publicly on August 5.

The FBI opened the full investigation on May 16, 2017—one week after President Trump dismissed FBI Director James Comey and one day before Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as Special Counsel. Unlike the original Crossfire Hurricane investigation, which concerned individuals associated with the Trump campaign, Oxferd Comma directly concerned the sitting president.

The opening communication stated that the FBI possessed:

“an articulable factual basis that reasonably indicates that President Donald J. Trump may be or has been, wittingly or unwittingly, involved in activities for or on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation which may constitute violations of federal criminal law or threats to the national security of the United States.”

Source: Declassified Oxferd Comma Documents, Opening Communication, May 16, 2017.

The stated purpose of the investigation was to determine whether Trump:

“is or was directed by, controlled by, and/or coordinated activities with, the Russian Federation”

Source: Declassified Oxferd Comma Documents, Opening Communication, May 16, 2017.

and whether Trump or others had obstructed or conspired to obstruct an associated FBI investigation.

The Stated Basis for the Investigation

The opening communication cited several categories of information:

• Information received during Crossfire Hurricane that a Trump campaign member had indicated Russia offered to assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Hillary Clinton.
• The intelligence community’s assessment that Russian intelligence had compromised Democratic networks and used DCLeaks and WikiLeaks to release stolen material.
• The Trump campaign’s involvement in changing Republican platform language concerning military assistance to Ukraine.
• Trump’s business and real-estate connections to Russia and other former Soviet states.
• Trump’s interactions with Comey, including his requests for loyalty, his desire for Comey to state publicly that he was not under investigation, his comments concerning the investigation of Michael Flynn, and the changing public explanations for Comey’s dismissal.

Because Trump held national political office, the FBI designated Oxferd Comma a Sensitive Investigative Matter. The opening communication described a full investigation as “the least intrusive method to address the serious national security risk posed by the activities alleged.”

The investigation was opened at the direction of Counterintelligence Division Assistant Director E.W. Priestap following consultation with the FBI’s Office of General Counsel, led by James Baker. Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe personally notified Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein on May 16.

Information Already Known to the FBI

By the time the FBI opened Oxferd Comma, the Bureau possessed substantial information raising questions about important elements of the broader Trump–Russia investigation:

• The Clinton Plan intelligence: FBI Director Comey attended John Brennan’s August 3, 2016 briefing concerning intelligence that Hillary Clinton had approved a campaign strategy to associate Trump with Russian election interference. The CIA formally transmitted the information to the FBI on September 7. Although the intelligence’s authenticity remained unresolved, the Durham Annex concluded that the FBI appeared to dismiss it as not credible without taking investigative steps to corroborate or disprove it.
• The origins and reliability of Steele’s reporting: The FBI knew that Steele had been conducting political opposition research. By February and March 2017, officials involved in the investigation broadly understood that Fusion GPS had first been retained during the Republican primaries and was later retained by someone connected to the Democratic Party. Steele had also been terminated as an FBI confidential human source for unauthorized media contacts.
• Warnings conveyed through Bruce Ohr: Ohr had informed the FBI about the political purpose behind Steele’s work and Steele’s strong opposition to Trump’s election.
• The primary sub-source interviews: The FBI’s January and March 2017 interviews with Igor Danchenko raised significant questions about Steele’s characterization of the underlying information. Danchenko indicated that Steele had misstated or exaggerated portions of what he provided and described some information as hearsay, casual conversation, or speculation.
• The Carter Page applications: The Justice Department Inspector General subsequently found that the FBI lacked information corroborating the specific allegations concerning Carter Page in Steele’s reporting when it relied on those reports in the original FISA application and its renewals. By May 16, the FBI had already submitted two renewal applications. A third followed on June 29. These findings are detailed in the Inspector General’s review of the four applications.

Doubts also existed within the investigative ranks. FBI agent William Barnett later told Justice Department investigators that he had not seen evidence of coordination between the Trump campaign and the Russian government while working on the investigation. On May 19, three days after Oxferd Comma opened, Peter Strzok privately expressed hesitation about joining Mueller’s team because of his “gut sense and concern there’s no big there there.” The full text exchange shows that Strzok was discussing the possible outcomes of the case and whether he should join the newly formed Special Counsel’s team; it was a private expression of uncertainty, not a formal FBI analytic conclusion.

Transfer to the Special Counsel and Closure

After Mueller’s appointment on May 17, responsibility for Oxferd Comma was transferred to FBI personnel assisting the Special Counsel. The closing communication states that Mueller’s jurisdiction included possible coordination between the Trump campaign and Russia, potential obstruction connected with the Russia investigations, and obstructive conduct involving the Special Counsel’s investigation itself.

Mueller delivered his confidential report to the attorney general on March 22, 2019. The Mueller Report stated that the investigation “did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.” On obstruction, Mueller did not reach a traditional prosecutorial judgment and stated that the report did not exonerate the president.

The FBI administratively closed Oxferd Comma on April 9, 2019. Its closing communication stated that all investigative leads had either been covered or discontinued.

What the Records Establish

The documents do not establish that Oxferd Comma was opened solely—or even principally—because of the Steele dossier. The opening communication did not cite the dossier and identified other information as its predicate. The public records also do not establish that every official involved in opening the investigation personally reviewed every warning concerning Steele or every piece of Clinton Plan intelligence.

They do establish, however, that the FBI opened a full investigation directly concerning a sitting president after the Bureau had accumulated substantial information raising questions about Steele’s reporting and while the Clinton Plan intelligence remained uninvestigated and unresolved. The investigation then passed to the Special Counsel and continued until Mueller completed his work.

Whistleblower Allegations Concerning the Assessment

To add even more intrigue, in July 2025, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released testimony from a former Deputy National Intelligence Officer who served on the National Intelligence Council from 2015 to 2020. The individual alleged that a superior pressured them to change analytic judgments during preparation of the 2017 assessment and sought their concurrence to help secure concurrence from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

I expressed tradecraft concerns and analytic disagreement with [redacted] over a key judgement in the TS/SCI and unclassified versions of the 2017 ICA.

Namely, I objected to overall framing of Russian activities as “efforts to influence,” as opposed to discredit the outcome of the 2016 election, and also judged that the 2017 ICA’s treatment of overt media activities was omitting important context.

In response, [redacted] actively pressured me to change my judgements, and stated clearly and directly to me that [redacted] sought my concurrence as a means to persuade the Defense Intelligence Agency, so that DIA would provide its concurrence with the analytic assessments of the 2017 ICA.

Source: ODNI declassified whistleblower testimony, p. 11.

In this passage, TS/SCI means Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. The phrase “discredit the outcome” refers to undermining confidence in the result rather than necessarily helping one candidate.

A subsequently declassified December 22, 2016 email exchange showed NSA Director Mike Rogers raising concerns about insufficient access and review time, while DNI James Clapper acknowledged that the agencies might have to “compromise on our ‘normal’ modalities” because additional time was “not negotiable.” The exchange provides additional evidence of the procedural pressure surrounding the assessment, although it does not independently verify the whistleblower’s account of being personally pressured to concur.